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Abstract
This paper tests for self-interested behavior by local-government bureaucrats
engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions. A theoretical
model is developed that shows the effect of Niskanen-style bureaucratic self-
interest in the two standard bargaining models: the demand-constrained model
and the efficient-bargain model. These predictions are then tested using
national cross-section data on unionized police, fire, and sanitation workers.
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1 . Introduction
A local government's labor costs, the most important element of local
public expenditure, are frequently determined through a process of collective
bargaining between the government and one or more public employee unions. Two
distinct views of government behavior in this bargaining process are possible,
with each view reflecting a different theory of bureaucracy. Under one view,
government bureaucrats are seen as disinterested agents whose only desire is to
serve the needs of their constituents. An alternative paradigm, however,
portrays government bureaucrats as acting on the basis of selfish motives.
Under this view, which originated in the work of Niskanen (1971) and others,
bureaucrats attempt to secure the largest possible budgets to increase their
power, compensation, and prestige.
This paper attempts to determine which of these views offers the more
accurate description of local government behavior in the collective bargaining
process. Such an inquiry is important because it reveals the extent of
consumer sovereignty in local spending decisions and gives insight into the
fiscal pressures felt by local governments. For example, it is frequently
alleged that public employee unions extort excessive bargaining settlements
from local governments and thereby damage their fiscal health. Indeed, many
commentators pointed to costly union settlements as a prime cause of New York
City's recent bankruptcy crisis. Under the benign view of bureaucratic
behavior, such outcomes must be attributed to union strength (and perhaps
government weakness) at the bargaining table. The self-interested view leads,
however, to a much different interpretation. Under this view, the notion of
governments and public employee unions as natural adversaries loses its
credence. Instead, union pressure may serve as a vehicle by which self-
interested bureaucrats can secure large budgets under the guise of a collective
bargaining process. The self-interested view thus radically alters the
interpretation of public sector collective bargaining and suggests a new
explanation for local fiscal distress.
The paper begins by offering a theoretical analysis of the effect of
self-interest on the bargaining outcome under the two standard bargaining
frameworks: the "demand-constrained" model, where the union chooses a point on
the bureaucrat's demand curve for labor, and the "efficient-bargain" model of
McDonald and Solow (1981), where bargaining outcomes are Pareto-eff icient
.
Self-interest is shown to have clearcut effects on the position of the labor
demand curve in the demand-constrained model and on the position of the
contract curve in the efficient-bargain model. Since the appropriate
bargaining framework cannot be established a priori, the empirical work tests
for the effects of self-interest in both frameworks.
The regression analysis uses three different cross-section samples of
municipal employment data representing unionized police, fire, and sanitation
workers. In the empirical work, the extent of bureaucratic self-interest in a
city is measured by a community competition variable equal to the number of
municipalities in the county containing the city. In the spirit of Tiebout
(1956), the argument is that if there are many alternative communities nearby,
then the bureaucrat must place more weight on constituent interests or risk
population loss to other jurisdictions.
3By providing the first theoretical treatment of bureaucratic behavior in
collective bargaining, this paper extends existing theoretical work in the
Niskanen tradition (for other contributions, see Migue and Berlanger (1974),
Romer and Rosenthal (1979), Moene (1986), and the survey paper by Orzechowski
(1977)). The paper also complements previous empirical work designed to test
models of bureaucracy, a literature that contains a variety of different
approaches. Ott (1980) and McGuire (1981), for example, recognize that the
pursuit of large budgets will drive bureaucrats toward the unit elastic point
on the constituent demand curve. Both authors look for evidence of this effect
in their data. In a different vein, Romer and Rosenthal (1982) attempt to
determine whether the outcomes of local spending referenda are affected by
reversion budget levels, as predicted by their theoretical work. Using
California data from before and after the passage of Proposition 13, Shapiro
and Sonstelie (1982) test for structural change between the two periods in a
model of local spending determination. They hypothesize that structural change
would be observed only if Proposition 13 had restricted the freedom of budget-
maximizing bureaucrats. Finally, in studies that are closely related to the
present paper, Sjoquist (1982) and Mehay and Gonzalez (1986) investigate the
effect of community competition on local spending per capita and public sector
wages, respectively (competition is expected to lower both). Neither paper,
2however, presents a theoretical model to support its hypothesis.
The present study also offers a contribution to the large literature on
public sector labor markets. Papers in this area, many of which are devoted to
estimating the effect of unions on public sector wages, include Ashenfelter
(1971), Bartel and Lewin (1981), Edwards and Edwards ( 1982a, b), Ehrenberg
(1973a, b), Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975), Hall and Vanderporten (1977),
Ichniowski (1980), Landon and Baird (1971), Nelson, Stone, and Swint (1981),
4Schmenner (1973), and Zax (1985). Among these studies, papers that control for
labor market monopsony effects bear an especially close relationship to the
present research (see, for example, Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975), Hall and
Vanderporten (1977), and Landon and Baird (1971)). These papers include a
community competition variable in their estimated wage equations, with the
expectation that greater competition lowers the monopsony power of public
employers and thus raises wages. In another closely related paper, Nelson,
Stone, and Swint (1981) construct a model of public sector strike activity
based on behavioral assumptions like those used below. They portray union
leaders and government bureaucrats as acting on the basis of both self-interest
and concern for their constituents.
Finally, by attempting to discriminate empirically between the demand-
constrained and efficient-bargain models of collective bargaining, the paper
joins a small recent literature directed toward this goal (see Eberts and Stone
(1986) and MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986)). The present approach to
discriminating between the models is novel and should be of interest to labor
economists working in this area. In another related study, Brown and
Ashenfelter (1986) estimate a bargaining contract curve using methods similar
to ours.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 incorporates bureaucratic
self-interest into the theoretical bargaining models and derives testable
hypotheses. Sections 3, 4, and 5 discuss econometric issues, data, and
empirical results. Section 6 offers conclusions.
2. Model
In setting up the model, we assume for simplicity that each community is
composed of identical individuals. A representative consumer's inverse demand
function for the public good q is given by f(q, /3) , where P is a vector of
5demographic variables that affect demand. Public consumption q in turn depends
on public labor input L and on the population n of the community. Holding L
fixed, q is decreasing in n as a result of congestion. In addition, since the
demographic variables in 13 may affect the productivity of public inputs (see
Hamilton (1983)), q also depends on /3. Holding the number of fire hours L and
population n fixed, for example, safety from fire will be greater in a higher-
income community given the better condition of the housing stock. Public
consumption thus can be written q = h(L,n,/3) , with h > and h < (the signs
Li n
of the elements of hR depend on the identities of the demographic variables)
.
The demand function for public employee labor can be derived by
substituting the h function into the demand function for q. This yields
F[L,n,f3) = f{h{L,n, (3) , (3) , where F is the inverse labor demand function, F =
Li
f h r < 0, and F = f h > 0. The latter inequality shows that the demand forq L n q n
labor is higher in a larger community as a result of the congestion effect.
The effect of the demographic variables on labor demand is given by the
derivative FR = f hR + fR . To appreciate the two forces affecting the sign of
the elements of this vector, consider again fire protection and income. Since
fire protection is undoubtedly a normal good, the income element of the vector
fR will be positive. However, since firemen are more productive in a higher-
income community, the income elements of hR and f hR are respectively positive
and negative. The upshot is that the sign of the income element of FR is
ambiguous, reflecting the offsetting effects of income on demand for protection
and the productivity of firemen. Since similar arguments can be made for other
public services and demographic variables, the effect of the f3 vector on labor
3demand cannot always be predicted a priori.
Letting w denote the hourly wage of public employees, aggregate consumer
surplus as a function of w and L can be written
L
Z = nF{ x, n,(3)dx- wL
[L
D{x,a)dx - wL, (1)
where D(L,a) = nF{L,n,/3) is the aggregate demand for public employee labor in
the community, with a = (n,/3). Note that since F > 0, D > holds as well,
indicating that aggregate demand for labor is higher in larger communities.
Bureaucrats in the model act on the basis of a strictly quasi-concave
utility function U{Z,L;o) in which labor L appears as an argument along with Z
(a is a parameter discussed below). Bureaucratic self-interest means that in
addition to caring about his constituents' surplus, the bureaucrat prefers a
higher level of public employment (both partial derivatives U and U are thus
positive) . While an alternative formulation more consistent with the Niskanen
tradition would insert budget wL in place of L in the utility function, using
labor as the self-interest variable simplifies the analysis without affecting
4
the main results.
The taste parameter a reflects the strength of the bureaucrat's self-
interest, with the marginal rate of substitution between Z and L assumed to be
increasing in a { in other words, the partial derivative of U /U with respect
Li £*
to a is assumed to be positive) . An increase in a thus makes the bureaucrat '
s
indifference curves steeper in [L,Z) space, indicating decreased willingness to
trade off L for Z (L is on the horizontal axis). Note that when the bureaucrat
cares only about his constituents, U will be identically zero (a then
Li
disappears from the utility function) . In this case, the bureaucrat is said to
be "constituency- interested" rather self-interested. For convenience, these
7two behavioral modes will be referred to as CI and SI in the ensuing
discussion.
In models in the Niskanen tradition, the bureaucrat's ability to exploit
the consumer derives from assymmetric information. The bureaucrat's production
costs are unknown to the consumer, which allows him to claim excessive costs in
the pursuit of a large budget. A similar information assymmetry allows a local
government bureaucrat to sacrifice consumer interests in the collective
bargaining process. In particular, being ignorant of the details of the
bargaining session, a constituent has no way of knowing whether an expensive
settlement was due to union aggressiveness or to self-interest on the part of
the bureaucrat.
We begin the analysis of bargaining outcomes by considering the demand-
constrained model, under which the union chooses its preferred point on the
employer's demand curve for labor. Once this analysis is complete, the
discussion turns to the efficient-bargain model. To develop the demand-
constrained model, the first step is to derive the properties of the
bureaucrat's demand curve for labor. Labor demand is found by inserting (1)
into the utility function and choosing L to maximize utility for a given wage.
The first-order condition for this problem is
U
L
/UZ + D{ L ' a) " W
= ° {2)
Since the derivative of the expression in (2) with respect to L (denoted A) is
globally negative, satisfaction of the second-order condition for the problem
5is guaranteed. To see how the degree of self-interest affects the position of
the demand curve, consider first the constituency-interested case, where U =
Li
0. Inspection of (2) shows that in this case, the optimal L satisfies D(L,a) =
w. As a result, the bureaucrat's inverse labor demand curve under CI, denoted
CI CI
D (L, a), is identical to the constituent demand curve [D {L,a) = D{L,ac)].
Under SI (where U > 0) , rearrangement of (2) shows that the optimal L
satisfies D(L,a) < w. This means that at the optimal L, the height up to the
constituent demand curve is less than the given wage. It follows, therefore,
that the bureaucrat's inverse demand curve under SI, denoted u (L,a,o) , lies
above the constituent demand curve at a given L [u [L,a,o) > D(L,a)]. It is
also easy to see that an increase in the self-interest parameter a raises the
SI
D curve. Letting L* denote the optimal L, totally differentiating (2) yields
L* = -MRS /A > 0, where L* is the derivative of L* with respect to a and
MRS is the (positive) derivative of U /U with respect to o. Since L*
Li Z,
increases with a, it follows that the inverse demand curve shifts to the right
as o increases. This in turn means that the height up to the curve at a given
cases are shown in Figure 1
.
CI J5I
Although the D curve is always downward-sloping, the £r curve could
have a positive slope, contrary to the situation shown in Figure 1.
Differentiating (2), the inverse slope of L> is equal to
L increases as self-interest grows [u > 0) . Demand curves in the SI and CI
Lw= a
~
X{lu
z
2{ulJz ' "zz":) + 1( (3)
The sign of (3) depends on the sign of the term U JJ - U JJ , which tells
whether L is a normal or inferior good in the bureaucrat's utility function.
If L is noninferior (if the MRS increases or stays constant moving vertically
in the (L,Z) plane), then this expression is nonnegative. The entire
derivative expression in (3) is then negative (recall A < 0) , indicating that
the if curve is downward-sloping, while noninferiority of L is thus
sufficient for a negative slope, the same outcome will obtain as long as L is
moderately inferior (as long as the first term inside the braces in (3) is
greater than -1). Given the plausibility of a negative slope, the LT curve is
assumed to have this property in the following discussion.
A change in the demographic vector a naturally affects the position of
the bureaucrat ' s demand curve . In the CI case , the bureaucrat ' s curve changes
in step with the constituent curve since the two demands are identical. In the
SI case, the effect of an increase in a on L* is again found by totally
differentiating (2), which yields
-1 -2
Li=~A {Da + UZ Wrf>Z- Wl)
[L
D {x,a)dx}
o
a
The sign of (4) again depends on the sign of the term U JJ - U JJ . When L is
noninferior and this term is nonnegative, it is clear from (4) that L* and D
have the same sign. Since the inverse demand curve shifts up (down) when L*
is positive (negative) , it then follows that u and D have the same sign,
indicating that the bureaucrat's demand curve moves in the same direction as
the constituents' curve when a increases. When L is inferior, on the other
hand, the sign of (3) is ambiguous and no definite connection can be made
between the movements of the two demand curves (moderate inferiority, however,
preserves the above result) . Despite this indeterminacy, it is clear that
demographic variables help determine the position of the bureaucrat's demand
curve and must be included in any empirical model.
With the analysis of the demand curve complete, we can now discuss the
impact of self-interest on the bargaining outcome under the demand-constrained
model. Under this model, the bureaucrat and the public employee union bargain
over the wage, and the bureaucrat chooses the level of employment. These rules
in effect allow the union to choose its preferred point on the bureaucrat's
demand curve. In making this choice, it is assumed that the union acts on the
:o
basis of the quasi-concave utility function V{ w, L; 5) , where 5 is a "supply"
parameter measuring the attractiveness of nonunion employment. McDonald and
Solow (1981) use an expected utility approach to derive a particular form for
this function. They assume that union members weight the utility of working at
the union wage (r(w)) by the probability of union employment (L/N, where N is
total union membership) and that they weight the utility of employment at the
nonunion alternative wage {r(w )) by the probability of such employment (1 -
L/N) . The resulting expected utility is (L/N) [r{w) - r[ w ) ] + r( w ) , which is
strictly quasi-concave in w and L as long as r" < 0. The alternative wage w
plays the role of 5 in this function, and it is easy to see that an increase in
w leads to flatter indifference curves. This property is reflected in our
general formulation, with V /V assumed to be decreasing in 5.
Figure 1 shows the demand-constrained bargaining outcomes in the CI and
SI cases, which are characterized by tangencies between union indifference
curves and the two demand curves. While it is clear that a union is better off
dealing with an SI bureaucrat (it reaches a higher indifference curve), no
general comparison can be made between the {w, L) outcomes in the two
situations. Both w and L could be higher in the SI case, as shown in Figure 1,
but either w or L (but not both) could be lower under SI than under CI. The
outcome depends on the positions and shapes of the union indifference curves
and the bureaucrats' demand curves. The same conclusion applies to a
comparison between outcomes under different degrees of self-interest (different
values of a), which shift the SI curve: (w,L) comparisons are inconclusive.
Given this indeterminacy, the empirical hypothesis regarding the effect of
bureaucratic self-interest in the demand-constrained model is simply that
bargaining outcomes are predicted to lie on a higher demand curve the greater
the degree of self-interest.
11
It is worth noting that on the basis of a verbal argument, Mehay and
Gonzalez (1986) predicted that wages would be lower in an environment where
substantial community competition limits the pursuit of bureaucratic self-
interest. As is clear from the above discussion, such an inference is
illegitimate in the present model. In addition, Sjoquist's (1982) hypothesis
that heightened community competition reduces per capita spending (and hence
the size of the budget) does not follow from the present model, while an
increase in budget (wL) is likely as self-interest increases, the tangency
point on the higher demand curve could actually be located at a point where wL
7is lower than at the previous tangency.
Additional empirical hypotheses relate to the effect of changes in the
demographic variables and union supply variable. As in the case of self-
interest, demographic changes have indeterminate effects on the bargaining
outcome (the tangency point on the demand curve can move in a variety of
possible directions as the curve shifts) . All we can say is that the
bargaining outcome will lie on a higher or lower demand curve depending on the
direction of the impact of the demographic variable in question. Changes in
the union supply variable, however, have a clearcut effect on the bargaining
outcome. As 5 increases (indicating better nonunion employment opportunities),
indifference curves become flatter and the tangency point moves up along the
demand curve, reducing L and increasing w.
The next step in the analysis is development of the efficient-bargain
model
.
Bargaining outcomes under this model consist of tangency points between
bureaucrat and union indifference curves, as explained further below. To
develop the model, it is necessary to derive the properties of the bureaucrat's
indifference curves in (w,L) space (these curves are closely related to the
demand curve analysed above). An indifference curve is the locus of {w, L)
\2
points such that U(Z,L) = u for some u. Totally differentiating this equality
to derive the slope of the implied indifference curve yields
dw/dC = [UL/U2 + D{L,a) - w]/L (5)
Comparing (5) and (2), it is immediately clear that indifference curves are
flat where they cross the demand curve. The reason is that the expression in
(2) is zero along the demand curve, yielding a zero value for the slope
expression (5). Moreover, since the derivative of (2) with respect to L is
negative, it follows that (2) is positive to the left and negative to the right
of the demand curve. Eq. (5) then implies that indifference curves are upward-
sloping to the left and downward-sloping to the right of the demand curve, as
shown in Figure 2 (utility increases in the downward direction) . To see that
for a given wage, the utility-maximizing L in fact lies on the labor demand
curve, note that this L value is given by a point of tangency between an
indifference curve and a horizontal wage line. Since this tangency occurs at
the peak of an indifference curve, it does indeed lie on the labor demand
curve.
To derive testable implications from the efficient-bargain model, the
effect of self-interest on the bureaucrat's indifference curves must be
analysed. Inspection of (4) shows that the indifference curve slope is
numerically larger when when U is positive than when U equals zero.
Li Li
Therefore, when the bureaucrat exhibits SI, the indifference curve passing
through a given point has a larger slope (more positive or less negative) than
when he exhibits CI. This comparison, which is consistent with the relative
positions of the demand curves, is shown in Figure 2. It is also easy to see
that an increase in the parameter a in the SI case numerically increases the
slope of indifference curves. This follows because the derivative of (4) with
respect to a, which equals MRS/L, is positive. Thus, an increase in the
strength of self-interest makes the indifference curve slope more positive or
less negative at each point in the (w, L) plane.
The bureaucrat's indifference curves are also affected by changes in the
demographic variables. Computation shows that the derivative of the slope
expression (5) with respect to a has the same sign as the L* expression in
(4). Recalling that the bureaucrat's inverse demand curve shifts up (down)
whenever (4) is positive (negative), it follows that indifference curve slopes
increase ( decrease ) when a demographic change raises ( lowers ) the bureaucrat '
s
demand curve.
With the above background, outcomes under the efficient-bargain model can
be characterized. Under this model, the bureaucrat and the union are assumed
to bargain over both the level of employment and the wage. Since the parties
will never agree to a bargain that leaves unexploited gains under these rules,
admissible bargaining outcomes consist of Pareto-ef f icient points in the {w, L)
plane. As long the bureaucrat's indifference curves exhibit the proper
curvature, this set of bargains is the locus of points where bureaucrat and
Q
union indifference curves are tangent. A portion of this locus, which is
called the contract curve, is shown in Figure 3 (note that the demand-
9
constrained bargain lies off the contract curve) . It is important to realize
that while an upward-sloping contract curve like the one shown in Figure 3 is a
natural outcome, a downward-sloping curve cannot be ruled out in the present
model. McDonald and Solow were able to exclude this possibility in their
model, which has a simpler demand structure than ours.
The degree of bureaucratic self-interest affects the position of the
contract curve through its effect on indifference curves. Recall from above
that a movement from CI to SI numerically increases the slope of indifference
Icurves, as does an increase in self-interest in the SI case. Since
indifference curves are downward-sloping in the vicinity of the contract curve,
an increase in self-interest therefore flattens the curves in this region.
Referring to Figure 4, it is clear that this slope change moves the tangency
point on a given union indifference curve downhill along that curve. When the
contract curve is upward-sloping, as in Figure 4, it is clear that a series of
these tangency movements has the effect of shifting the curve to the right.
The same principle can be used to derive the impact of changes in the
demographic and union supply variables. Recall that any demographic change
that raises the bureaucrat ' s demand curve also increases the slope of his
indifference curves. A demographically-caused increase in demand thus flattens
the indifference curves in the vicinity of the contract curve. As in Figure 4,
this slope change shifts the contract curve to the right. On the other hand,
since an increase in the union supply variable 5 flattens the union
indifference curves, it follows that the tangency point on a given bureaucrat
indifference curve moves uphill along that curve as 5 increases. It is clear
from a redrawn Figure 4 that a series of such tangency changes shifts the
contract curve to the left.
When the contract curve is downward-sloping, parameter changes have an
indeterminate effect on the position of the curve. This can be seen by
referring to Figure 5, which shows two sets of contract curves based on
different families of union indifference curves. In the case where the
contract curve is steep, cutting the indifference curves from above (case A in
the Figure), it is easy to see that a flattening of the bureaucrat's
indifference curves shifts the curve to the right. However, when the contract
curve is flatter, cutting the indifference curves from below (case B) , a
flattening of the bureaucrat's indifference curves shifts it to the left. Note
that in both cases, the tangency point on a given union indifference curve
moves downhill along that curve as the bureaucrat's indifference curves
flatten. The effect of such changes on the overall position of the contract
curve depends, however, on the curve's orientation relative to the indifference
11
curves.
As before, a flattening of the union indifference curves in response to
an increase in the supply parameter 5 has an impact opposite to the above. In
particular, the contract curve shifts to the left (right) in case A (B) as the
union indifference curves flatten. As will be seen below, the fact that
flatter union and bureaucrat indifference curves lead to opposing shifts in the
contract curve in this otherwise ambiguous situation proves very useful in
evaluating the empirical results.
The predicted effect of bureaucratic self-interest on the position of an
upward-sloping contract curve is the main testable implication emerging from
the efficient-bargain model. Details of the empirical procedure for testing
this hypothesis and the previous hypothesis from the demand-constrained model
are discussed in the next section of the paper.
3. Econometric Methodology
It is useful to discuss econometric methodology in some detail to
appreciate the differences between the estimation problems in the demand-
constrained and efficient-bargain cases. To do this, let w = Q (L,5,v)
represent the equation of the union indifference curve with utility level v.
In an empirical model, the demand-constrained bargaining outcome under SI then
represents the solution to the following stochastic equation system:
w = IT (L, a, o) + pQ (6)
w= QV(L,5,v) +
^
(7)
16
E^
J(L,a.a) = Q^{L,5,v) + j^, (8)
where the jj. are error terms. The endogenous variables in this system are w,
L, and the utility level v. Note that (6) and (7) state that the demand and
indifference curves touch at the bargaining outcome (subject to a stochastic
error) while (8) says that the intersection involves a tangency (subject again
to an error) . To estimate the demand curve in (6) , L on the right hand side
must be treated as endogenous, with the equation estimated using a method such
as two-stage least squares. The exogenous variables in the reduced form are
then a, a and 5.
Letting w = Q {L,a,o,u) give the equation of the bureaucrat's
indifference curve with utility level u, the equations characterizing an
efficient bargain are
w = Q ( L, a, o, u) + 4>Q ( 9
)
w = QV{L,6,v) + <P (10)
QU
r
{L,a,o,u) = QV
r
{L,8,v) + <*>
, (11)
Li Li Z
where the 4>. again are error terms. Eqs. (9) and (10) state that the
bureaucrat and union indifference curves touch, and (11) says that the
intersection involves a tangency (again subject to errors) . Since this system
has four endogenous variables ( w, L, u, v) but only three equations, another
equation is needed to close it. This equation tells where on the contract
curve the bargaining outcome lies. Letting Y denote a vector of variables
representing the bargaining strengths of both parties, the missing equation can
be written
u = G(Y) + *
3
. (12)
1 7
This equation shows how the bureaucrat's achieved utility level depends on his
own bargaining strength as well as that of the union. Note that once u is
determined, a value for v follows automatically.
To derive an estimating equation from the above system, (9) , (10) and
(11) are solved simultaneously for u and v in terms of L, a, o, S, 4> , <P , and
<P . The u solution is substituted into (9) to yield
w = Q [L,a,o,u{L,a,o,5,<t>Ql 4>
1
,4>
2
)] + 4>Q
= r(L,a,a,5,* ,^r *2 ), (13)
which gives the equation of the contract curve. Note that the position of the
curve depends on the exogenous variables a, a, and <5 as well as on three error
terms. Note also that since w is the dependent variable in (13), the
discussion of shifts in the contract curve in response to an increase in a or a
must be reoriented. In particular, the predicted rightward shift in an upward-
sloping contract translates into a downward shift in the w direction (see
Figure 4). This implies negative coefficients for the a and a variables in
(13).
To close the reduced model, the u solution is substituted into (12),
yielding
u(L,a,a,5 f # ,*lf #2 ) = G(Y) + <Py (14)
Eqs. (12) and (13) determine w and L as functions of the exogenous variables
(including Y) and the errors. Note that the reduced equation system is
recursive in that (14) determines L directly and (13) then determines w. While
this suggests that the contract curve in (13) should be estimated by ordinary
least sguares, this procedure will in fact yield inconsistent estimates. The
reason is that the stochastic parts of the two equations share common elements
] 3
{4> ,4> ,<P ) , which makes a technique such as two-stage least squares appropriate
even though the system is recursive. The exogenous variables in the reduced
form would be a, a, 5, and the bargaining-strength variables Y.
Note that despite similarities, the estimation strategies for the two
models show key differences. In the demand-constrained case, w is regressed on
L, a, and a, with L treated as endogenous and the union supply variable 5 added
as an exogenous variable in the reduced form. In the efficient-bargain case,
however, w is regressed on L, a, and a and on the union supply variable <5, with
the bargaining-strength variables Y added as exogenous variables in the reduced
form. From above, the coefficient of the bureaucratic self-interest variable a
should be positive in the demand-constrained model (the estimated demand curve
should shift up) and negative in the efficient-bargain model as long as the
contract curve is upward sloping (the contract curve should shift down in this
case) . Of course, since both models cannot be accurate representations of the
bargaining process, it would be surprising (and disconcerting) if both these
predictions held. As will be seen, however, the empirical results for one of
the models are not internally consistent, which provides a way of
discriminating between them.
4. Data
To gather data for the empirical work, the 1982 Census of Governments
Bargaining Units Tape was used to identify cities with bargaining units for
police, fire, or sanitation employees. Although the presence of a bargaining
unit does not always mean that employees are covered by a collective bargaining
12
agreement, this is usually the case in bargaining-unit cities.
Excluding cities with populations below 25,000 yielded a police sample
with 310 municipal observations, a fire sample with 283 observations, and a
sanitation sample with 37 observations. For each city, data from the 1982
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Municipal Yearbook were used to compile the L variable (measured in work hours)
and w, represented by the labor cost per hour (computed by dividing total
13
compensation, including fringe benefits, by work hours)
.
The following demographic variables (representing a) were collected from
the 1983 County and City Databook , with the variable name and year of
collection in parentheses: population (POP, 1980); population density (POPDEN,
1980) ; median family income (MEDINC, 1979) ; percentage of the population
nonwhite (NONWHT, 1980)
;
percentage of the population with a high school degree
(HSDEG, 1980) . In addition, two additional variables measuring price effects
were included in the empirical model. These are median house value (MEDVAL,
1980) and the percentage of government revenue from outside sources (IG0VREV,
1981), which determines the cost of a given wage bargain to a city's residents
(the source for these variables is the County and City Data Book ) . It can be
shown that by increasing consumer surplus, an increase in IG0VREV raises the
14bureaucrat ' s demand for labor as long as L is normal ( see above )
.
Two variables were selected to measure the attractiveness of nonunion
employment (represented above by 5) . These are the average manufacturing wage
in the county containing the city in question (MFGW, 1980) , collected from the
County and City Data Book
, and the state unemployment rate (UNEMP, 1980)
collected from the Statistical Abstract of the United States . A number of
variables were chosen to measure bargaining strength (Y above). The most
important of these is the percentage of the public employees in the state that
are unionized (UNION, 1980) , collected from the Directory of U.S. Labor
Organizations
. Another measure is a dummy variable indicating the city's form
of government (FG0VT, 1980) which assumes the value zero for the mayor-city
council form and one for the city manager form (city managers are expected to
be skilled bargainers)
. This variable was collected from the Municipal
Yearbook . Finally, on the belief that there may be regional differences in
bargaining strengths, regional dummies were also included as explanatory
variables. The variables, REGNE, REGNO, and REGW, represent the northeast,
north central and western states respectively (the default region is the
south)
.
As mentioned above, the strength of bureaucratic self-interest is
measured by a community competition variable (denoted CCMP) equal to the number
of municipalities with populations over 25,000 in the county containing the
city in question. This variable was compiled by referring to maps in the 1980
Census of Population . The reason for choosing this measure is that if there
are many communities nearby, the bureaucrat must place more weight on
constituent interests or face the threat of emigration to other jurisdictions.
It is important to note that a higher value of COMP is assumed to alter the
utility function underlying the bureaucrat's behavior (by lowering a). It
might be argued instead that a higher COMP should tighten a constraint faced by
the bureaucrat without changing his preferences. For example, by indicating a
greater range of consumer choice, a higher value of COMP might raise the
minimum utility that the bureaucrat must guarantee to his constituents but
would not affect the extent of his own self-interest. Such an approach,
however, turns out to be unworkable in the above theoretical framework. In any
case, the present approach can be justified by arguing that bureaucrats who
survive in office have utility functions that reflect the maximum amount of
self-interest that is sustainable given the amount of competition they face
from other communities.
5. Empirical Results
We begin by presenting the results from estimation of the contract curve.
Table 1 presents two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of log-linear
contract curves for the three samples with the wage as dependent variable.
Along with L, the right-hand variables include the demographic variables listed
above as well as the union supply variables MFGW and UNEMP. Additional
exogenous variables in the reduced form are the bargaining-strength variables
UNION and FGOVT and the regional dummies. The first thing to note about the
results is that the estimated curves are downward-sloping, with the L
coefficients significantly negative in each case. While this outcome is
possible in principle in the model, its unnaturalness suggests that the
estimated relationships may not represent contract curves. This suspicion is
confirmed by further inspection of the coefficients, which show a fundamental
inconsistency in the results. To see the problem, recall that while the
effects of parameter changes on the position of a downward-sloping contract
curve are indeterminate, the curve's response to a flattening of the
bureaucrat's indifference curves is the reverse of its response to a flattening
of the union's indifference curves (see Figure 5 and the associated
discussion)
. The estimates in Table 1 violate this requirement since, in each
case, an increase in population (which is expected to flatten the bureaucrat's
curves) and an increase in the manufacturing wage (which flattens the union
curves) both lead to an upward shift in the estimated curve (with the exception
of MFGW in the sanitation equation, all the relevant coefficients are
significant)
. This inconsistency suggests that the estimated relationships
cannot be viewed as contract curves.
This negative result contrasts with the findings of Eberts and Stone
(1986) and MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), who discriminate between the efficient-
bargain and demand-constrained models on the basis of nested hypothesis tests
that favor the former model. In a sense, the present test is more stringent
than theirs because the regressions are meant to estimate the entire contract
curve rather than equations corresponding to first-order conditions. It is
therefore not surprising that the efficient-bargain model fails in the present
context. It should also be noted that Brown and Ashenfelter (1986) estimate a
contract curve using an approach similar to ours, although they are interested
in very different issues. Their estimated contract curve, which like ours has
both supply and demand variables on the right-hand side, is used to test the
hypothesis of "strong efficiency," under which employment is affected by the
alternative wage but is insensitive to the contract wage. This hypothesis is
rejected.
Turning to the demand-constrained model, Table 2 presents both linear and
log-linear 2SLS estimates of an equation corresponding to the bureaucrat's
demand curve. The regressions differ from those in Table 1 in that the union
supply variables MFGW and UNEM3 do not appear in the second-stage equation.
These variables are included in the reduced form along with UNION, the regional
dummies, and the demographic variables. Although there is no rigorous rational
for the appearance of UNION and the regional variables in the reduced form
(these were viewed above as bargaining-strength measures) , this specification
yielded the most satisfactory demand estimates.
Referring to Table 2, the L coefficients are significantly negative in
four out of six estimated equations, indicating downward-sloping demand curves.
The emergence of negative coefficients is not surprising given that the Table 1
slopes are also negative and the model specifications are quite similar. ±
Focusing on the demographic variables, the population coefficients in Table 2
are usually positive and significant, indicating higher demands for public
employees in larger cities. Also, the impact of population density on demand
is significantly positive in every equation, confirming expectations. Income
coefficients are significant, however, only in the police equations, indicating
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higher demand for police in richer communities. The absence of income effects
in the fire and sanitation equations contradicts earlier estimates derived from
reduced-form expenditure equations (see Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and
Borcherding and Deacon (1972)). However, the discussion in section 2 showed
that a perverse income effect is plausible when the productivity of public
(especially fire) employees increases with the income level of the community.
A better educated population has no apparent effect on the demand for any
of the services, with the HSDEG coefficients in Table 2 insignificant and
unstable in sign across the equations. A large nonwhite population, however,
appears to increase the demand for police and fire employees, with the NONWHT
coefficients in the linear equations positive and significant in each case (the
log-linear coefficients are insignificant) . Presumably, this reflects the
poverty associated with a large nonwhite population, which places extra demands
on police and fire departments.
As for the two variables measuring price effects, higher house values
appear to raise the demand for fire protection (as one would expect) , with both
MEDVAL coefficients positive and close to significant in the fire equations.
While a higher MEDVAL has no effect in the police equation, higher house values
appear to lower the demand for sanitation workers, an effect which may capture
the more modest sanitation needs of suburban communities. Contrary to
expectations, communities with greater access to outside revenue sources do not
generally have higher demands for public employee labor. While the IGGVREV
coefficients in Table 2 show the expected positive sign in five out of six
cases, only the linear fire equation's coefficient is significant.
Given that the curves estimated in Table 2 exhibit many of the properties
of demand curves, it seems safe to conclude that the data is broadly consistent
with the demand-constrained model of collective bargaining. Armed with this
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knowledge, we can then test for the operation of bureaucratic self-interest by
seeing how the demand curve responds to a change in the community competition
variable. Since a higher value of COMP reduces the bureaucrat's ability to
pursue self-interest, we expect to find negative COMP coefficients (indicating
a downward shift in demand as competition increases) . Referring to Table 2, it
is immediately clear that the results are inconsistent with the self-interest
hypothesis. COMP's coefficient is insignificant in the linear police equation
and in each of the fire and sanitation equations, and is significantly positive
in the log-linear police equation. Therefore, the results show no evidence of
the operation of bureaucratic self-interest in the collective bargaining
process
.
It should be noted that this conclusion is not entirely robust to the
specification of the equations. In particular, when L is regressed on w
instead of vice versa, the fire equations show significantly negative COMP
coefficients (the other equations again show no COMP effect). The fact that
this outcome disappears in the w-on-L regressions suggests, however, that it
cannot be taken too seriously. Other changes in the reverse regressions are
that the police INC coefficients become insignificant, the POPDEN effect on
demand becomes less consistently positive (as do the NONWHT effects on police
and fire demand) , and that the MEDVAL effect disappears in the fire equations.
Also, while the wage coefficients are generally negative, they are less
17frequently significant than in Table 2.
To see the connection of the present results with earlier work, it is
interesting to consider the wage equations from the reduced form of the present
model. This is the kind of equation that has been estimated in most other work
on public sector labor markets. Table 3 shows linear and log-linear wage
equations for the three samples. The table shows that police and fire wages
25
are increasing in POP, POPDEN, INC, NONWHT, and MEDVAL. Moreover, police and
fire wages are higher outside the south (the default region) and are high where
manufacturing wages are high and where the work force is highly unionized
(unemployment effects are not significant). In contrast, the wages of
sanitation workers show little systematic relation to the explanatory variables
(population density has a positive effect, as does location in a western
state) . This outcome could be the result of imprecision in the estimates due
to the relatively small size of the sanitation sample.
Turning to the COMP variable, Table 3 shows that greater community
competition leads to higher police and fire wages. Given that bureaucratic
effects have been ruled out, it is tempting to attribute this outcome to the
monopsony effect used to explain similar findings in previous studies. Under
this effect, a weakening of monopsony power due to increased community
competition leads to higher wages. The problem with this explanation is that
the monopsony effect emerges in a situation where employers exert market power
in their hiring practices when faced with a competitive supply of labor. Under
demand-constrained bargaining, however, labor supply is controlled by the
union, which exercises its own monopoly power in the bargaining process. The
monopsony effect is therefore not relevant in the present context, which means
that some other explanation of the effect of COMP on police and fire wages must
be sought
.
Referring back to Table 2, the significantly positive COMP coefficient in
the log-linear police equation suggests that police demand increases with
community competition. It is likely that the positive impact of COMP on police
wages reflects this demand shift. Although the reason for the demand shift is
not clear, it could be that COMP is picking up demand effects related to the
overall size of the metropolitan area (police demand may be high in communities
18
that are part of a large metropolis due to negative spillover effects)
.
Since Table 2 shows no evidence of a COMP effect on fire demand, the
positive fire wage effect cannot be attributed to a demand shift. A clue as to
the origin of the effect is given by the reduced form L equations, which show
that an increase in COMP reduces fire hours (COMP effects are absent in the L
equations for police and sanitation) . Thus, although the fire demand curve is
itself unaffected by COMP, the bargaining outcome moves up along the curve as
COMP increases, with w rising and L falling. This type of movement is
consistent with descriptions of the goals of firefighter unions found in the
literature, which portray the unions as attempting to shorten the work week.
Evidently, the unions are more successful in achieving this goal when community
competition is stronger. The exact mechanism for this effect is unclear but
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could be the subject of further research.
6 . Conclusion
This paper has tested for the operation of bureaucratic self-interest in
collective bargaining outcomes for police, fire, and sanitation workers. The
results show the absence of a self-interest effect, indicating that a consumer-
sovereignty model of local government behavior may be accurate. This finding
is consistent with the conclusions of McGuire (1981) but inconsistent with the
results of Mehay and Gonzalez (1986), Ott (1980), Romer and Rosenthal (1982),
Shapiro and Sonstelie (1982), and Sjoquist (1982), who interpret their findings
as favoring the bureaucracy framework.
Along the path to its empirical conclusion, the paper offered several
innovations. The first of these is development of a bureaucratic model of
collective bargaining that shows explicitly how self-interest affects the
bargaining outcome under the demand-constrained and efficient-bargain
2 7
frameworks. Secondly, the paper's approach to discriminating between the two
frameworks, which involves sequential estimation of the contract curve and
demand curve, is different from previous methods. This approach could be
applied in future research designed to discriminate between the two bargaining
models.
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Table 1
2SLS Contract Curve Estimates
(Log-Linear Equations)
CONST
POP
POPDEN
INC
HSDEG
NONWfT
MEDVAL
IOOVREV
MFTJW
UXEMP
COMP
POLICE FIRE SANITATION
2.28 E+00 3.41 E+00 -1.23 E+00
(2.74) (2.49) (-0.74)
4.13 E-01 -4.46 E-01 -3.64 E-01
(-2.58) (-2.49) (-2.58)
4.83 E-01 5.14 E 01 3.30 E-01
(2.80) (2.84) (2.19)
5.84 E-02 1.15 E-01 2.69 E-01
(2.18) (4.29) (2.64)
3.22 E-02 -2.62 E-01 2.36 E-01
(-0.32) (-1.56) (0.56)
4.48 E-02 -1.57 E-01 7.26 E-01
(0.66) (-1.69) (1.57)
1.88 E-02 -1 . 15 E-03 4.95 E-02
(1.25) (-0.08) (0.88)
1.20 E-01 2.02 E-01 -1.88 E-01
(2.42) (3.48) (-0.96)
3.31 E-02 2.32 E-02 4.83 E-02
(-0.90) (0.56) (0.43)
4.51 E-01 4.33 E-01 4.32 E-01
(4.25) (3.88) (1.11)
1.16 E-01 3.70 E-02 1.44 E-01
(1.53) (0.17) (0.45)
4.31 E-02 1.77 E-02 3.28 E-02
(2.66) (0.85) (0.45)
Dependent variable is the wage; L is endogenous
t -ratios in parentheses
Table 2
2SLS Demand Curve Estimates
POLICE FIRE SANITATION
CONST
POP
POPDEN
INC
HSDEG
NONWHT
MFDVAL
IOOVREV
CXJMP
log-linear linear log-linear linear log- linear linear
2.34 E+OO 4.24 E+OO 3.08 E+OO 5.19 E+00 -5.68 E-01 8.27 E-00
(3.15) (3.16) (2.46) (2.61) (-0.32) (1.18)
-3.31 E-Ol 5.24 E-05 -3.62 E-01 -4.71 E-04 -4.42 E-01 -1.45 E-04
(-2.39) (0.53) (-2.19) (-2.88) (-2.47) (-0.37)
3.98 E-01 -5.04 E-03 4.32 E-01 3.41 E-02 4.12 E-01 5.00 E-03
(2.68) (-0.38) (2.58) (3.05) (2.21) (0.50)
9.09 E-02 2.20 E-01 1.36 E-01 3.01 E-01 3.10 E-01 7.07 E-01
(3.78) (3.60) (5.39) (4.50) (2.89) (1.99)
2.40 E-01 2.27 E-01 3.48 E-02 1.08 E-01 4.17 E-01 1.94 E-01
(2.74) (5.25) (0.24) (1.56) (0.90) (0.72)
6.22 E-02 1.96 E-02 -1.01 E-01 -9.30 E-03 8.75 E-01 2.54 E-02
(0.96) (1.13) (-1.15) (-0.39) (1.77) (0.25)
1.98 E-02 2.55 E-02 4.32 E-03 3.83 E-02 5.02 E-02 -3.74 E-C2
(1.40) (2.23) (0.30) (2.78) (0.80) (0.50)
2.85 E-02 6.94 E-03 1.00 E-01 1.56 E-02 -3.44 E-01 -8.38 E-02
(0.63) (0.91) (1.93) (1.54) (-1.89) ( 1.85)
6.26 E-03 1.09 E-02 5.02 E-02 3.80 E-02 7.19 E-02 -5.11 E-02
(0.19) (0.90) (1.26) (2.09) (0.60) (-1.03)
3.46 E-02 1 . 75 E-02 1.98 E-02 -1.65 E-02 3.66 E-02 -2.74 E-02
(2.24) (1.45) (1.00) (-0.81) (0.46) ( 0.13)
Dependent variable is the wage; L is endogenous
t ratios in parentheses
Table 3
OLS Wage Equation Estimates
POLICE FIRE
log- linear linear log- linear linear
CONST 4.43 E-01 3.14 E-01 -2.16 E-01 -9.68 E-01
(1.50) (0.22) (-0.58) (-0.63)
POP 4.32 E-02 1.62 E-03 7.47 E-02 1.89 E-03
(3.47) (2.97) (5.30) (3.71)
POPDEN 7.26 E-02 1.99 E-01 5.56 E-02 1.16 E-01
(4.06) (4.50) (2.59) (2.73)
INC 8.59 E-02 1.05 E-01 4.37 E-02 9.26 E-02
(1.26) (2.-18) (0.51) (2.02)
HSDEG 9.07 E-03 1.75 E-02 -3.58 E-02 1.19 E-02
(0.20) (1.20) (-0.54) (0.72)
NONWtfT 1.74 E-02 3.33 E-02 2.54 E-02 4.65 E-02
(1.65) (3.32) (2.11) (4.88)
MEDVAL 9.16 E-02 1.46 E-02 1.68 E-01 2.00 E-02
(2.12) (1.89) (3.23) (2.55)
IGOVREV 2.85 E-03 -1.66 E-03 3.38 E-02 1.31 E-03
(0.12) (-0.15) (1.11) (0.11)
MFOW 3.43 E-01 6.96 E-01 3.14 E-01 4.74 E-01
(4.18) (4.05) (3.49) (3.07)
IHEMP -7.23 E-02 -8.53 E-02 6.50 E-02 6.98 E-02
(-1.35) (0.86) (1.01) (0.71)
REGNE 6.08 E-02 7.58 E-01 2.07 E-01 2.34 E+00
(1.27) (1.26) (3.79) (4.05)
REGNC 1.02 E-01 1.05 E+00 7.30 E-02 8.80 E-01
(2.15) (1.85) (1.41) (1.66)
REGW 1.36 E-01 1.66 E-00 1.14 E-01 1.27 E+00
(3.31) (3.32) (2.46) (2.69)
UNION 1.24 E-01 3.53 E-02 1.15 E-01 2.10 E-02
(3.40) (3.06) (2.87) (2.00)
ucmp 3.82 E-02 1.35 E-02 4.62 E-02 2.01 E-02
(3.35) (1.25) (3.49) (1.85)
SANITATION
log-linear linear
-2.36 E-00 -1.24 E+00
(-1.17) (-0.14)
-4.26 E-03 9.55 E-05
(-0.06) (0.02)
2.11 E-01 5.57 E-01
(2.03) (1.61)
-1.83 E-01 -1.42 E-02
(-0.42) (-0.05)
1.02 E+00 4.61 E-02
(1.92) (0.40)
-1.18 E-03 -8.88 E-03
(-0.02) ( 0.14)
-2.87 E-01 -2.88 E-02
(-1.32) (-0.54)
-3.35 E-02 -3.20 E-02
(-0.28) (-0.59)
2.74 E-01 1.30 E-02
(0.67) (0.01)
1.50 E-01 5.69 E-01
(0.37) (0.97)
1.78 E-01 1.82 E+00
(0.63) (0.55)
1.52 E-01 1.74 E+00
(0.69) (0.62)
3.56 E-01 3.80 E+00
(1.77) (1.39)
2.08 E-01 4.59 E-02
(1.12) (0.77)
2.88 E-02 7.26 E-02
(0.37) ( 0.34)
Dependent variable is the wage; t-ratios in parenthesis
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Footnotes
*We wish to thank the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at the
University of Illinois for its support of this research. Also, we thank
Larry Kahn, Fran Blau, and Pablo Spiller for useful comments. Errors, of
course, are ours.
It would also be possible to test for bureaucratic self-interest in a
nonunionized setting. However, since it appears that pursuit of self-
interest is more easily disguised by bureaucrats in the collective bargaining
process, this context is likely to be more fruitful for the study.
2
Hamilton (1978) also uses a community competition variable in his study of
the effect of zoning on housing prices. He hypothesizes that local
governments' ability to raise housing prices (benefitting landowners) through
the use of zoning practices is limited by community competition.
3
It should be noted that this type of argument invalidates the estimates of
income elasticities of demand derived by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973)
,
Borcherding and Deacon (1972), and similar subsequent studies.
4
The appearance of L in the utility function could also reflect the political
power of public employees as an interest group. Bureaucrats wishing to
guarantee their own longevity may need to cater to this group by guaranteeing
high public employment levels. For a theoretical model based on this idea,
see Courant et al . (1979).
5
The derivative of (2) with respect to L equals
A '- DL
+ U
Z
3{UZ^L - 2UZLU2?L + ULLUZ
2)
•
which is negative given D < and strict quasi-concavity of U.
Li
c
In the case where w and L are normal goods in the union utility function and
the SI and CI demand curves happen to be parallel, both w and L are higher
under SI. Nonparallel demand curves may overturn this result, however, even
under the normality assumption.
7
The question is whether the new tangency lies above or below the rectangular
hyperbola passing through the original tangency point. Either outcome is
possible, although the latter is implausible.
Q
Since the bureaucrat's indifference curves are not guaranteed to be
everywhere concave, the optimality of the tangency points is also not
guaranteed and must be assumed.
9
Under McDonald and Solow's version of the utility function, indifference
curves are asymptotic to a horizontal line at height w , which implies that
the contract curve stops where this line intersects the demand curve. This
outcome need not occur in a more general formulation.
Sufficient conditions for an upward-sioping contract curve in the present
model are that w and L are normal in the both the bureaucrat and union
indifference maps. While normality imposes the usual restrictions on the
union indifference curves, this condition means that the bureaucrat curves
become flatter (steeper) moving vertically (horizontally) in the (w,L) plane.
The proof of the above fact is available on request.
The conclusions drawn from Figures 4 and 5 can be derived analytically.
Computations show that holding w fixed, the derivative of the L value on the
contract curve with respect to a has a sign opposite to that of the
derivative of the contract-curve jv value with respect to the bureaucrat's
utility level. Recalling that lower bureaucrat indifference curves
correspond to higher utility levels, it is easy to see from Figure 4 that w
decreases as the bureaucrat's utility rises along an upward-sloping contract
curve. The same thing happens along a downward-sloping curve like that of
case A in Figure 5. The above result shows that in these cases, L must rise
with o, indicating a rightward shift in the contract curve. In case B of
Figure 5, arises as the bureaucrat's utility increases, which means that L
must fall with a (indicating a leftward shift of the contract curve). It
should also be noted that case A of Figure 5 is ruled out when both the
bureaucrat and union indifference maps exhibit normality of L. Proofs of the
above facts are available on request
.
12
For example, the 1982 Census of Governments reports that of the 1,089,736
organized municipal employees (those represented by a bargaining unit)
,
1 , 002 , 546 were covered by contractual agreements
.
13
The fact that work weeks are different for uniformed and nonuniformed fire
employees was taken into account in computing total fire hours.
14
This analysis reflects the assumption that intergovernmental revenue comes in
the form of a matching grant rather than a block grant.
15
Note that the implied wage elasticities of demand from the log-linear
equations (the reciprocals of the w coefficients) are implausibly large, with
values between -2 and -4. When L is regressed on w, however, the
elasticities are -.32, .-.25, and -1.38 for the three services.
1 fi
Another way of checking this conclusion is to regress the budget wL on all
the exogenous variables in the model. Recall that while budget is not
guaranteed to increase with self-interest, such a result is likely as the
demand curve shifts up. The results show insignificant COMP coefficients in
all equations, confirming the absence of a self-interest effect. This
conclusion contradicts the findings of Sjoquist (1982).
17
The t-ratios for the population coefficients also increase dramatically, with
the coefficients themselves showing population elasiticities near unity in
the log- linear equations.
18
Although the MEDVAL, POPDEN, and INC variables should capture the
metropolitan size effect to some extent (being higher in large metro areas)
,
COMP captures any such effect most directly.
19
It should be noted that one aspect of the L equations does not conform to the
predictions of the theory. While the positive MFGW coefficients in the w
equations should be accompanied by negative MFGW coefficients in the L
33
equations (indicating that the bargaining outcome moves up along the demand
curve as MFGW rises) , the latter L coefficients are in fact always positive
(though usually insignificant)
.
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